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OF STATE TAX ON THE "TAKING OF GAS"
A Texas statute' placed an occupational tax on gas gathering,
defined as "the first taking or the first retaining of possession of
such gas for other processing or transmission. 2 Appellants, the
Michigan-Wisconsin Company, bought their entire supply of gas
from a Texas producer. The gas was processed, then was taken
into the company's line, and was compressed so that it would flow
through the interstate pipes. The tax was upheld by Texas courts
in a suit to test its validity.3 On appeal the United States Supreme
Court held the taking to be an inseparable part of interstate
commerce, the gas being in continuous flow from well to pipes
and that the tax, as applied to appellants, was invalid. Michigan-
Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 74 Sup. Ct. 396 (1954).
Since Louisiana has a statute4 almost identical to that of
Texas, the decision will be of considerable importance to this
state. The problem facing the Court in this case was whether or
not the tax, under the broad definition of gas gathering in the
statute, was delayed until the gas became a part of interstate
commerce itself.5 The rules of state taxation of interstate com-
merce are highly complicated, confusing and seemingly contra-
dictory. No attempt, however, is made here to present a complete
1. Tex. Laws 1951, c. 402, § 23(2): "In addition to all other licenses and
taxes levied and assessed in the State of Texas, there is hereby levied upon
every person engaged in gathering gas produced in this State, an occupation
tax for the privilege of engaging in such business, at the rate of 9/20 of one
cent per thousand (1000) cubic feet of gas gathered."
2. Tex. Laws 1951, c. 402, § 23(1) (c) : ". . . the term 'gathering gas' means
the first taking or the first retaining of possession of such gas for other
processing or transmission whether through a pipeline . . .or otherwise after
such gas has passed through the outlet of such [original processing] plant."
3. Calvert v. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co., 255 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1953).
4. LA. R.S. § 47:671 (1950): "In addition to all other licenses and taxes
levied and assessed in the State of Louisiana, there is hereby levied upon
every person engaged in gathering gas produced in this state, an excise,
license or privilege tax, for the privilege of engaging in such business, at the
rate of one cent (1¢) per thousand (1,000) cubic feet .. .of gas gathered."
According to LA. R.S. § 47:673 (1950), gathering gas means "the first
taking or the first retaining of possession of gas produced in Louisiana for
transmission through a pipe line, after the severance of such gas, and after
the passage of such gas through any separator, drip, trap or meter that may
be located at or near the well. In the case of gas containing gasoline or
liquid hydrocarbons that are removed or extracted in commercial quantities
at a plant by scrubbing, absorption, compression, or any similar process, the
term 'gathering gas' means the first taking or the first retaining of possession
of such gas for transmission through a pipe line after such gas has passed
through the outlet of such plant .. "
5. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 74 Sup. Ct. 896, 401 (1954).
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analysis of this topic., A brief outline of the basic developments
will be sufficient to locate the position of the instant case within
the overall framework. Indeed, the problem of state taxation is
but a part of the entire subject of residual powers of the states
with regard to the Commerce Clause and other powers delegated
to the federal government.
The United States Supreme Court has announced certain
standards which a state tax affecting interstate commerce must
meet before it will be sustained. First, the tax cannot dis-
criminate against interstate commerce.7 In the instant case, the
levy was not discriminatory, for it was laid on all gas gathering
within the state, regardless of whether the gatherer was engaged
in interstate or intrastate commerce.8
Until 1938, the Court would not allow a state tax to stand
if it constituted a direct burden on interstate commerce;'9 al-
though it was valid if it only placed an indirect burden on it.'0
However, this test seems unfair to the states. Interstate com-
merce derives certain benefits from the states; it should be
obliged to pay its own way, as is local commerce. Realizing this,
Mr. Justice Stone formulated the multiple burden doctrine, which
controlled from 1938 until 1946.11 Under this rule a state could
not lay a tax which could be duplicated by the other states
through which the articles of commerce flow. This rule seems
to be the more equitable one. It does not entirely relieve inter-
state commerce from payment of its due share to the states, yet
it prevents double taxation of the commerce. The multiple
burden doctrine appears to be in line with Madison's opinion:
"A very material object of this power [regulation of inter-
6. For recent comprehensive analyses of the subject, see Barrett, State
Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 4 VAND. L. REV. 496 (1951); Note, State
Taxation and Interstate Commerce, 54 COL. L. REv. 261 (1954).
7. Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946); Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311
U.S. 454 (1940).
8. 74 Sup. Ct. 396, 400 (1954).
9. Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U.S. 1 (1933). Accord: Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co.
v. Tax Commission, 297 U.S. 403 (1936); Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massa-
chusetts, 268 U.S. 203 (1925); Ozark Pipe Line Co. v. Monier, 266 U.S. 555
(1925).
10. Southern National Gas Corp. v. Alabama, 301 U.S. 148 (1937); Atlantic
Lumber Co. v. Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation, 298 U.S. 553
(1936); Matson Navigation Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 297 U.S. 441
(1936); Virginia v. Imperial Coal Sales Co., 293 U.S. 15 (1935); Hope Natural
Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U.S. 284 (1927); Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Richmond,
249 U.S. 252 (1919); Watters v. Michigan, 248 U.S. 65 (1918).
11. Western Live Stock Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938). Accord:
Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80 (1948); McGoldrick v. Berwind-
White Coal Mining Co., 809 U.S. 33 (1940); Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher,
306 U.S. 167 (1939).
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state commerce] was the relief of the States which import
and export through other States from the improper contribu-
tions levied on them by the latter. Were these at liberty to
regulate the trade between State and State, it must be fore-
seen that ways would be found out to load the articles of
import and export during their passage through their juris-
diction with duties .... -12 (Italics supplied.)
Thus, it was a main purpose of the Commerce Clause to prevent
multiple taxation by those states through which commerce
flows.' s Conversely, it was not intended to make it immune to all
state taxation. 14 However, where the states have attempted to tax
foreign corporations which are engaged merely in transporting
goods through the state (as, for example, a pipeline, 5 a branch
office in the state,' 6 the loading and unloading of vessels,'! and
motor vehicles' 8 ), the taxes have been invalidated.
Since gathering gas was defined as the first taking of the gas
after production,' and since there could be but one such instance,
it would seem that the tax could not be duplicated by other
states on gas produced in Texas. Furthermore, the statute also
required that the gas be produced within the state.2 0 Although
other states might enact similar legislation, it would not seem
to affect appellant's gas, regardless of how many times it was
gathered after leaving Texas. Nevertheless, the Court indicates
a fear that this would happen.2 1
Since Freeman v. Hewit22 in 1946, the decisions of the Court
have not been in agreement as to which rule would be followed.28
That case completely ignored the multiple burden doctrine and
struck down an Indiana tax on gross incomes on the sole basis
12. THE FEDERALIST, No. 42 at 274 (Madison) (Mod. Lib. ed.).
13. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 258, 259 (1938).
14. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 258, 259, 260
(1938); Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Richmond, 249 U.S. 252, 259 (1919).
15. Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier, 266 U.S. 555 (1925).
16. Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203 (1925).
17. Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. State Tax Commission, 302 U.S. 90
(1937).
18. McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309 U.S. 176 (1940).
19. Tex. Laws 1951, c. 402, § 23(1)(c). See note 2 supra for text.
20. See note 1 supra for text.
21. 74 Sup. Ct. 396, 403 (1954).
22. 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
23. The theory of Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue is followed
in: Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, 337 U.S. 662 (1949); Memphis
Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80 (1948). The theory of Freemanv . Hewit
is followed in: Joseph v. Carter & Weekes, 330 U.S. 422 (1947). See also the
dissent in Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, 337 U.S. 662, 669 (1949).
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that it was a direct imposition on interstate commerce,'2 4 a re-
version to the pre-1938 doctrine. The next year, the Court inval-
idated a gross receipts tax which could not be duplicated in its
effect by other states, because the occupation burdened, though
carried on entirely within the state, was essentially a part of
interstate commerce itself.25 This is, then, another way of stating
the direct burden theory.
In the instant case the Court states the principle that a tax
on the "local activity related to interstate commerce is valid if,
and only if, the local activity is not such an integral part of the
interstate process . . . that it cannot realistically be separated
from it. ' 2s This is the theory which has prevailed for over a hun-
dred years.2 The Court decided that the first taking of the gas by
appellants could not be separated from the interstate commerce
because the gas was already moving in interstate commerce,
being in continuous flow from the well into the pipes. But if
continuity of flow is the basis for finding the gas to be an
integral part of interstate commerce, it would appear that it
should also be such from the time that it began its upward
movement from the interior of the earth, and a state could not tax
it at any point thereafter. Moreover, in Utah Power & Light Co. v.
Pfost,28 the Court had held that an Idaho tax on all electrical
energy generated within the state was valid, even though about
eighty-five percent of the energy went to other states.
24. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 256 (1946): A "State has various
means of obtaining legitimate contribution to the costs of its government,
without imposing a direct tax on interstate sales. While these permitted
taxes may, in an ultimate sense, come out of Interstate commerce, they are
not, as would be a tax on gross receipts, a direct imposition on that very
freedom of commercial flow which for more than a hundred and fifty years
has been the ward of the Commerce Clause." (Italics supplied.)
In a dissenting opinion to this case (id. at 285-86) Mr. Justice Douglas
said: "Any receipt of income in Indiana from out-of-state sources involves,
of course, the use of interstate agencies of communication. That, alone,
however, is no barrier to its taxation by Indiana. Western Live Stock v.
Bureau of Revenue. . . . For a local activity which is separate and dis-
tinct from interstate commerce may be taxed though interstate activity Is
Induced or occasioned by it....
"The present tax is not aimed at interstate commerce and does not dis-
criminate against it. . . . The tax is on the proceeds of the sales less the
brokerage commissions and therefore does not reach the revenues from the
only interstate activities involved in these transactions ...
"I would adhere to the philosophy of our recent cases [Western Live
Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938), and McGoldrick v. Berwind-
White Coal Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940)] and afflrm the judgment below."
25. Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422 (1947).
26. 74 Sup. Ct. 396, 401 (1954).
27. Cooley v. The Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, 12 How.
299 (U.S. 1851).
28. 286 U.S. 165 (1932).
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In the Pfost case it was found that "the generator and the
transmission lines perform different functions"; 29 thus, that tax
fell only on a local aspect of the commerce.3" The object of the
tax, then, could realistically be separated from the interstate
process. But, in view of the fact that electricity travels almost
instantaneously, it would seem that the first taking of gas (which
was its entrance into the Michigan-Wisconsin Company's pipes
from the producer's pipes), as well as its compression, can be
separated as realistically as can the generation of electricity. It
may be added that as the generator and lines perform different
functions, so do the compressor and pipes. Furthermore, the
apparent impossibility of the tax being duplicated on appellants
by other states has already been brought out.21
Moreover, in Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line
Co.,3 2 the Court upheld a privilege tax on the production of power
to run a compressor, used for the same purpose as the one in the
principal case. The tax fell about the same place in transit in
both instances-in fact, in the Coverdale case, it came after the
taking, for the tax was on the production of the power used in
the compression of the gas. Such power production would seem
to be as much an integral part of interstate commerce as the
taking, for without the compression, the gas would not flow
through the pipes.
An interesting point about the instant decision is its un-
animity. Mr. Justice Black has usually been hesitant to strike
down non-discriminatory state legislation alleged to be a regula-
tion of interstate commerce, in the absence of congressional
action to the contrary.33 He would uphold the state law, even if
the tax might possibly be duplicated by other states.3 4 Moreover,
29. Id. at 180.
30. Id. at 181.
31. See page 693 supra.
32. 303 U.S. 604 (1938).
33. For analyses of the position usually taken by Mr. Justice Black on
this subject, see Barnett, Mr. Justice Black and the Supreme Court, 8 U. op
CHL L. REv. 20 (1940); FRANK, MR. JUSTICE BLACK 154-191 (1949).
34. In the dissenting opinion in Gwinn, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henne-
ford, 305 U.S. 434, 445 (1939), it was stated: "While there are strong logical
grounds upon which this Court has based its invalidation of state laws actu-
ally imposing unjust, unfair and discriminatory burdens against interstate
commerce as such, the same grounds do not support a judicial regulation
designed to protect commerce from validly enacted non-discriminatory state
taxes which do not-but may sometime-prove burdensome .... So here, if
national regulation to prevent 'multiple taxation' is within the constitutional
power of this Court, it would seem to be time enough to consider it when
appellant or some other taxpayer Is actually subjected to 'multiple taxation.'"
(Italics supplied.)
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he has expressed the view that it is for Congress, not the Court,
to decide how far a state may go in regulating interstate com-
merce if such regulation is not discriminatory.3 5 Has he relin-
quished this view by his asquiescence in this decision?
In conclusion, it is easy to formulate the proposition that a
state tax on interstate commerce is valid if it is on a separable,
local incident and invalid if on an inseparable, integral part of
the commerce. The difficulty arises when this abstract proposition
is applied to a concrete case, and one is called upon to decide
whether the object of the tax in question is separable or insepar-
able, local or national in scope. Reasonable minds can well differ
as to when the object becomes inseparable from, and a direct part
of, interstate commerce, for in making that determination it is
easy to point out distinctions where they apparently do not exist.
James M. Dozier, Jr.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTER-GOVERNMENTAL TAXATION-
IMMUNITY FROM STATE SALES TAX OF CONTRACTORS
UNDER "COST-PLUS-A-FIXED-FEE" CONTRACTS
WITH THE UNITED STATES
Two tractors to be used in the construction of a government
project were purchased by private contractors as "purchasing
agents for the Government."' An Arkansas "gross receipts" tax2
was levied on the sale and paid by the contractor's vendor under
protest. The plaintiff vendor alleged that the tax was, in effect,
a tax on the federal government and therefore invalid. The
Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the'tax.8 On appeal to the
35. Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 452 (1939):
"Congress is the only department of our government-state or federal-
vested with authority to determine whether 'multiple taxation' is injurious
to the national economy ......
Id. at 455: "I would return to the rule that-except for state acts
designed to impose discriminatory burdens on interstate commerce because
it is interstate-Congress alone must 'determine how far [interstate com-
merce] . . . shall be free and untrammelled, how far it shall be burdened by
duties and imposts, and how far it shall be prohibited.' [Welton v. Missouri,
91 U.S. 275, 280 (1875).]"
1. Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 74 Sup. Ct. 403, 409 (1954).
2. Ark. Gross Receipts Tax Act of 1941, ARK. STAT. §§ 84-1901, 84-1902(e),
84-1903, 84-1908 (1947).
3. Parker v. Kern-Limerick, Inc., 254 S.W.2d 454 (Ark. 1953). The
Arkansas Supreme Court relied on Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1
(1941), holding that the legal incidence of the tax fell on the private con-
tractor. When the incitdence, which refers to the specific person or agency
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